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INTRODUCTION
On December 14 th , 2006 the former Chief of Staff, United States Army, General
Schoomaker said, "We are now five years removed from 9/11; the Army continues fighting this long war with high levels of force deployment, while preparing for an uncertain and complex future". 1 His words are indeed correct as the security environment for the military practitioner has changed significantly. In order to better prepare for and stay ahead of the new, and highly complex, security environment the U.S. Army must transform how it attempts to understand, plan, and communicate.
The United States, on September 11 th , 2001, was confronted with an adversary that had been approaching since the end of the Cold War. During the previous 40 years, nations, groups, and even individuals had been virtually forced to choose sides with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. As the Berlin Wall fell, the will of the world was no longer shaped by the competing ideologies of Western Democracy and Eastern Communism. While many in the West perceived the fall of Communism to be a triumphant win with perpetual peace among the great powers being finally in hand, others understood it to be an opening through which to proffer their own ideology. 2 This was an ideology that did not require a State through which to gain legitimacy.
This ideology was spurned on, in large part, by globalization. Globalization, defined by Thomas Barnett in his book Blueprint for Action as, " [t] he worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people" has changed the security environment. 3 Globalization has exponentially increased the threats to health and human security, as demonstrated during the summer of 2007 when worry over the spread of tuberculosis by an American determined to attend his wedding and honeymoon in Greece gripped the nation. 4 Further, ideas can be exchanged anonymously over the internet allowing for an increase in recruitment of potential new terrorists from areas that were once before either unknown or too difficult to reach. Another effect globalization has had on the security environment has been a disaffected population that is increasingly able to understand that there are others who are living better via the capabilities of wireless technology. These disaffected were, and still are, being targeted by those seeking to promote their own ideals. As is often the case, those people who have been left behind, whether through the ineptness of their state or because of a lack of education, become attracted to an alternative, and religiously based transnational terrorist organizations have been largely effective in providing that alternative.
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Why the United States Army largely missed the signs that a new threat was approaching and was slow to understand and adequately plan for this change is what is of primary interest in this monograph. It is my contention that the United States Army's military decision making process, which has changed little since its debut in the 1932 version of FM 101-5, is no longer viable given the current, and future, operating environment(s) and must be updated and/or expanded in order to better affect the current and future environments. 6 The U.S. Army must adopt measures at all levels of the planning process to better understand the complexities of the environment within which they are operating. The U.S. Army must better communicate its plan 4 Anahd O'Connor and John Holusha, "TB Patient is Related to C.D.C. Expert on Disease," The New York Times, May 31, 2007 , under "Health," http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /05/31/health/31cnd-tb.html?_r=1&oref=login (accessed September 20, 2007 . 5 According to a guide for teachers regarding globalization, "There are some who link the negative aspects of globalization to terrorism. To put a complicated discussion in simple terms, they argue that exploitative or declining conditions contribute to the lure of informal "extremist" networks that commit criminal or terrorist acts internationally." Social Science Research Council, "Teaching Guide for Globalization Essays," http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/teaching_resource/tr_globalization.htm (accessed 25 August 07). and not just to other military members, but also to other governmental agencies (OGA), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and multi-national and coalition partners. And as an area warranting further research, I will discuss why the U.S. Army should consider expanding its current force structure to more adequately address the complex situations faced.
Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States Army focused the majority of its effort on protecting the West from the spread of Communism. The Army, recognizing the value of a large and powerful fighting force as demonstrated in World War II and later in Korea, focused its efforts on building, training, and maintaining an Army that could repel Communist aggression. Armor, artillery, and infantry Divisions were placed along strategic borders around the world in show of force deterrent capacities. The enemy was studied and his tactics were largely understood. The National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) were established in order to hone the requisite skills to defeat any large scale opposition.
These training centers, which focused at Brigade level and below, as well as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) which focused on Division and higher level operations, were developed in order to ensure that the United States Army was ready to rapidly defeat this well understood opposing force. Concurrently, the Army's decision making process, as written into FM 101-5, focused decision making on the mission, opposing forces, enemy and friendly situations, and the decision (or the when, where, and why of what was to be accomplished). This doctrine solidified how Army planning, training, and execution was carried out.
With the end of the Cold War the United States Army still remained focused almost exclusively on fighting a Cold War like opposition, whether that was a resurgent Russia or a strengthening China. Little additional thought was given to how to plan operations in an environment where force on force engagement was, or is, not the main avenue through which to defeat, or force change, upon the opposition. And yet with ever increasing frequency, peacekeeping, nation building, humanitarian relief, and since 9/11, counterinsurgency operations have become the Army's primary efforts. Even though both the NTC and the JRTC have evolved from modeling just Cold War adversaries and are now assisting soldier training by focusing on non-kinetic means to pacify insurgencies, we still have been largely unable to overcome the complexity inherent in these non-warfighting situations. One of the challenges that the Army faces is how to effectively plan for its warfighting missions while at the same time being able to understand and plan for the non-force on force mission sets. The U.S. Army has clearly demonstrated its capability, both historically and in recent years, to plan for and execute combat operations. Unfortunately the Army has fallen short when taking on non-warfighting tasks. So how does the U.S. Army improve? The Army improves by transforming itself in order to more effectively deal with the increased complexity of the current and future operating environment(s). Complexity resides on the battlefield in varying degrees, as in any situation that involves struggles between opposing human wills, but the Army's planning process was designed around providing solutions to problems that are largely understood from the beginning. 10 The U.S. Army is staffed with both uniformed and civilian professionals who plan operations, often against a known opponent, ensuring that the right people and equipment are at the right place and at the right time to inflict the desired effect. The Army is further able to hone its skills at NTC and JRTC, and other training venues because the problem sets practiced are essentially well defined, i.e. destroy the Third Motorized Infantry Brigade or conduct cordon and search operations during an insurgency. The Army's problem solving and planning process is less capable of dealing with problems of greater ambiguity.
In situations where complexity is high, being able to comprehend the problem early allows for an enhanced ability to minimize the effects that the complexity adds to the situation.
The complexity of non-warfighting tasks is significant because it often includes multiple actors often working with their own agendas, even for the same goal. These are situations where a single overarching and unifying goal remains ill-defined and yet various actors and activities are still attempting to provide the solution. Gary Klein in his book, Sources of Power, studied how people make decisions in challenging situations and argues, like many others, that "we are attracted to the standard advice of following the stages from problem definition to option generation and evaluation. Yet in dealing with an ill-defined goal, the advice is sure to fail. The first step, define the goal, can never be completed if the goal is ill defined, and that means the an article written by Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege, "Our doctrine predisposes us to formulate an excellent plan for the wrong problem".
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In order for the U.S. Army to be better equipped to formulate an excellent plan for the right problem I believe that it is necessary for us to expand the current military problem solving and planning process. In this monograph I will provide information that should help to increase the reader's understanding of the security environment. The security environment that we should be focusing on requires leaders and planners to understand considerably more than simply how best to deploy and engage the opposition. I will then discuss the Army's military decision Based Approach (EBA) can be utilized. Third, I will describe how and why we need to more effectively communicate our goals in order to affect lasting and positive change in a complex environment. Fourth, I will discuss a topic for further research, an idea that will likely be contentious to readers from the military services, by discussing why we should expand our military population beyond its current makeup. Finally, I will conclude with a summation of the information provided in this monograph.
Our Security Environment
By utilizing the knowledge, provided in part by expert researchers and in part through personal experiences, military leaders and planners should be better equipped to understand the complexity of current and emerging security dilemmas. This concept however is often easier to acknowledge than to apply. Based upon our cold war experiences and the resultant title of lone superpower, policy makers, academicians, and the average citizen alike, were left feeling almost invulnerable. Facing down the communist threat for some 40 years and coming out on top seemed to mean that a large military with sophisticated weapon systems, supported by democratic ideals and a free market economy was the recipe for success. What we failed to notice, at least collectively, was that by removing the Soviet structure, conflict would spread to states that had once been under at least tacit control of the former Soviet Union or the United States. Essentially people in many parts of the world were left to figure things out for themselves. Power struggles ensued as both individuals and groups who had been forced to set aside their own desires or identities attempted to regain what they once had. Many attempted to capitalize on these new opportunities as a means for enhanced wealth and growth. Our own historical experiences told us that these experiences were a part of the growth process. While far from gaining definitive knowledge on how the environment can affect security, we can now postulate at least two conditions which affect security in general and environmental security specifically: environmental scarcity and therefore the reactions of economics, politics, and law as one potential factor; and wealth and power related conflict which has been a cause of environmental degradation as another. I will now provide some background on human security and global health. The linkage between human health and security is broad. Its linkage covers such ground as the impacts of violence and conflict on individuals and societies, global infectious diseases, and poverty and inequity. The challenge for many in the military will be in accepting that health problems are related to a security concern that would require military involvement. An example is the affect that AIDS has had in many African nations. "While the average age of life expectancy in the United States is now 77 years, it is less than 50 years in most of Africa, and less than 40 years in some of the AIDS-ravaged countries." 20 Security has been directly impacted by decreased life expectancy which, over time, lowers the pool of potential leaders and innovators.
Incapable leadership and innovation, over time, will serve to decrease internal, and even external, stability. 21 A military deployed to restore civil services within an area of operations that no longer has a viable leadership base, above the age of 40, could find itself in a protracted deployment.
The rapid transmission of diseases due to increased eases in travel in expansive global markets provides additional validity to the argument of a need for a focus on global health and human security. The goal of a health and human security approach should be to minimize or negate the impact of violence and conflict, disease, and inequity in order to enhance our collective and individual existence. 25 The arguments for achieving such a lofty goal are many considering the advancements made in such areas as medicine and technology and the corresponding impacts of globalization. However, the practicality of all human and health security endeavors must also consider the potential policy and operational implications. The information provided here regarding human and health security is just a small portion of what must be considered.
Terrorism, like environmental and health and human security, can be a relatively difficult concept to wrap the proverbial hands around, even though the United States has been actively involved in the Global War of Terror since 2001. The phrase terrorism itself has become a common part of our daily lexicon yet it assumes more than one simple meaning and is often applied almost haphazardly to any event which frightens us. While terrorism has been in practice for hundreds of years, with the word itself achieving popular use during the French Revolution, it has essentially become known to mean, "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through We must also come to understand the terrorist's motivation. While the pursuit of political change is the endstate, it is critical to understand whether the terrorist action is most likely following a left-wing, right-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatist, or a religious agenda. Each has shown a differing propensity for violence with the religious terrorist being the most dangerous as well as the most current threat facing the United States. Audrey Kurth Cronin in his article "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" gave five reasons why religious terrorists may be especially dangerous to international security:
eligious terrorists often feel engaged in a Manichaean struggle of good against evil, implying an open-ended set of human targets, meaning that anyone who is not a member of their religion or religious sect may be "evil" and thus fair game; religious terrorists engage in violent behavior directly or indirectly to please the perceived commands of a deity; religious terrorists consider themselves to be unconstrained by secular values or laws; religious terrorists often display a complete sense of alienation from the existing social system; and religious terrorism is especially worrisome because of its dispersed popular support in civil society."
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Terrorists, who operate outside of the international, state based, system have benefited from the rise of the internet. Although their desire to achieve political change requires that their actions be noticed, their ability to plan and carry out attacks requires anonymity. Utilizing information technology, terrorists have been increasingly successful in sharing critical information, enhancing their recruitment efforts, and publicizing their actions. Certainly it is clear that enhanced knowledge of the various ideologies and desires that influence terrorist actions is critical for improving security. Another area which has been a cause for concern is weapons proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.
Depending upon who is asked, there are both pros and cons of increased nuclear proliferation. 28 Proliferation considerations include such items as the potential impacts of reducing access to dangerous pathogens as part of a counterterrorism effort, and the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in containing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery via ballistic missiles. While chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons pose a significant risk, their value and abilities to harm vary greatly. Nuclear weaponization is an extremely complex task that is nearly impossible to achieve covertly and has been generally controlled through the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There are those who argue that a state which has nuclear weapons is unlikely to go to war with other nuclear armed states, at least to the point where the conflict cannot be contained, and thus a controlled proliferation is in the best interest of all. 29 The counter, of course, is that just because nothing significant has happened before, does not mean that nothing will in the future. 30 This has become especially acute with the increased terrorist activity since the 1990's. In all of the above cases, the knowledge of the effectiveness of deterrence must be clearly understood so as not to hamper other related security initiatives such as the deterrent attributes of a nuclear weapons capability or the benefits which can be derived from nuclear power; chemical and biological research that enables defense related vaccinations; and the ability to operate missile warning satellites.
Expanding the breadth of knowledge of security related issues better enables military practitioners to sift through the complexity of today's security environment. While there is obviously a considerable degree of variation in what exactly constitutes a security issue, knowledge enables us to unlock the meaning of our experiences, thus opening the door of our ability to better comprehend the complexities that exist. Defining security is a complex process which includes an almost unending set of actors that influence that process. This complexity was first noted in the discussion of expanding the democratic peace. Determining whether scarcity or conflict played the bigger role in environmental security was left up to debate. Global health and human security brought forth a whole new level of understanding by examining the challenges faced by decreasing mortality rates in AIDS ravaged Africa. Terrorism, of significant interest and focus in the current efforts of the U.S. in the Global War on Terrorism, demonstrated the difficulties in clearly defining the subject, let alone overcoming its affects given the extreme measures that a religious terrorist is likely to employ. Finally, weapons proliferation called into question the varying challenges faced in proliferation. In some cases WMD proliferation is undesirable and even unavoidable and in others it may well be a means to enhanced security. In the end, what is certain is that the study of security related issues is essential if we are to someday achieve freedom from danger or worry. By first obtaining a base of knowledge, we are better postured to understand our experiences and thus focus our abilities on achieving real and lasting security. The LION series of exercises are designed to allow SAMS students to put into practice the theory and doctrine learned through study and seminar discussion. The focus for LION I was a notional request for US military assistance to a country in Africa and was created largely to determine the students understanding and ability to utilize the MDMP. From the notional higher commander's intent, the purpose was to ensure that territorial integrity and governmental authority of the requesting nation were maintained. The notional higher headquarters endstate was for U.S. forces to establish a defensive capability within the requesting nation's territory in order to deter outside aggression, and support a peaceful resolution to any territorial disputes.
Problem Solving and Decision Making
Provided this higher guidance, along with the more specific Warning Order, the students went to work utilizing the tenants of FM 5-0. From the beginning there was never any attempt made to try and gain any further appreciation for the problem(s) of the nation requesting support. Rather the problem became how to best deploy the forces necessary to achieve the desired defensive capability. The plan was completed following the MDMP and notional forces were deployed to the area in accordance with the guidance and with an effort to put the host nation forces in the lead role as much as possible. But it is also likely the host nation's neighbors would just wait until a later time to threaten the host nation's sovereignty. There is also a possibility, similar to Napoleon's reaction to Prussia's buildup of forces along the Prussian Western front in 1806 that the host nation's neighbors may view the deployment of U.S. forces into the host nation as a prelude to war.
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I am not advocating that subordinate organizations within the military consistently challenge the guidance of a higher headquarters. However, if the planning staff has little to no knowledge of the area of operations, the planning staff must make attempts to better understand the general nature of the problem which has forced U.S. military involvement. This is different than planning for operations against a known enemy. However, if the purpose of an operation is to ensure that territorial integrity and governmental authority of the requesting nation are maintained, as it was in the LION I scenario, and the endstate is for U.S. forces to establish a defensive capability within the requesting nation's territory in order to deter outside aggression, and support a peaceful resolution to any territorial disputes, I would insist that the subordinate headquarters' planning staff take the time necessary to first understand the nature of the problem.
If an alternate understanding of the problem has been realized, then it becomes essential to question the guidance of the higher headquarters in order to increase the likelihood that success can and will be achieved at all levels.
FM 5-0, Chapter 2, discusses Army problem solving as a prelude to the MDMP and briefly discusses problems as being well-structured, medium-structured, or ill-structured. Army's Seven
Step Problem-Solving Model as presented in FM 5-0, and seen below, presents the reader with how problem solving should be conducted.
Army problem solving leads the reader to believe that the problems the military will face are solvable. However, my contention is that while the Army's Seven
Step Problem-Solving Model can be a useful tool, its systematic approach can actually limit problem understanding for operations that are outside the traditional military force on force engagement planning.
Ultimately, a system that relies primarily on a commander's knowledge, experience, and personality to drive the problem solving and planning process, planning will be commander centric and not problem focused.
The value of including a means to better understand the problem and its complexity to the military planning and problem solving process should by now be apparent. According to Dietrich Dorner, "To deal effectively with a system: We need to know on what other variables the goal variables we want to influence depend. We need to understand, in other words, how the casual relationships among the variables in a system work together in that system; we need to know how the individual components of a system fit into the hierarchy of broad and narrow concepts. This can help us fill in by analogy those parts of a structure unfamiliar to us; and we need to know the component parts into which the elements of a system can be broken and the larger complexes in which those elements are embedded. We need to know this so that we can propose hypotheses about previously unrecognized interactions between variables".
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This could be done by utilizing Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and Effects Based Approach (EBA) as part of the process. It is important to note that while both SOD and EBA are primarily focused on campaign design and planning, there is potentially value added to Army planning, at all levels, given the complex nature of events as well as the degree to which coordination and general problem solving must include organizations outside of the Army.
Systemic operational design, created by Shimon Naveh, was developed to assist military leaders in achieving a better understanding of a more complex operating environment. SOD attempts to cause practitioners to focus on the unique problem(s) faced without using a prescribed template. A hallmark of SOD is the discourse among the design team and extended involvement by the commander in the process. While SOD is still being reviewed and exercised to determine its value it certainly has strengths which should be utilized before moving headlong into the current MDMP.
Army planning, without SOD, is essentially a linear approach to problem solving that attempts to achieve a level of certainty and control through a decision procedure. In taking a linear approach, Army planning assumes that perfect information can be found that will lead to a perfect solution. Traditionally, Blue forces utilizing the Joint Operation Planning or Military Decision Making Processes, along with the elements of operational design, produce a product that allows the commander to shape the battlefield in such a way as to cause the defeat of the Red forces. The concept of SOD argues that this may be a faulty approach especially in a non-linear environment. In a nonlinear system all variables are interdependent, the systems are sensitive to 39 Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them initial conditions, the system output and input are not proportional, and nonlinear systems divide into multiple states. 40 SOD questions the system instead of making assumptions. SOD accepts that there is uncertainty and makes attempts at managing the uncertainty instead of eliminating it.
The philosophical approach of SOD prescribes a period of design that precedes planning and expects that there will be discourse among the various stakeholders rather than directionally oriented guidance.
Understanding requires flexibility and an acceptance that a solution may be impossible to reach. On a philosophical level SOD accepts that one can never understand the whole system within which one operates, and even if that were possible, it would be impossible to know that this had been achieved. 41 This is a concept that is difficult for military personnel to truly grasp.
There are few organizations staffed with personnel determined to provide solutions as is the U.S.
Army and its service members.
EBA is intended to support an integrated approach to current decision making processes, at the operational and higher levels, and is already part of joint doctrine. EBA, when taken in conjunction with the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), adds a System of System Analysis (SoSA) to Mission Analysis and then based upon a better understanding of the system(s) attempts to define the required effects, nodes, actions, and resources (ENAR) that can be utilized as part of course of action (COA) development to achieve the desired effect(s). 42 Unlike SOD, EBA has a greater degree of structure and more attention is paid to affecting interactions within the system.
Currently the Army has decided to move away from EBA as part of its doctrine. Whether SOD, EBA, or both, the point is that Army planning must be expanded to gain a greater appreciation for what the problem really is and how that problem relates to the desired endstate. Both are, however, thought processes that can assist military leaders and planners to maneuver more effectively through the complex and non-linear.
Communication and Organization
Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War wrote, "Attempting to ingest a wide-ranging literature in one gulp, I became puzzled by the contrasting views of authors who, while ostensibly dealing with the same subject matter, arrived at different and often contradictory conclusions". The sample mission tasks listed for actions by friendly force and for effects on enemy forces, as provided in Figure 3 .7 below, are narrow in scope describing essentially force on force actions and are not necessarily useful for peacekeeping, nation building, or humanitarian relief efforts.
Referring back to FM 3-07, it is stated that commanders plan for stability operations and support operations in a manner like they plan for the offense and defense. FM 3-07 even references FM Norms are those behavior statements that have become accepted and shared by a group's members. Group norms can and do have a significant impact on individual behaviors as they are associated with the group. Two studies, the Hawthorne and Asch, have provided evidence that conformity to group norms can and do cause individuals to alter their behaviors to achieve conformity. 53 It is important for Army personnel to have an understanding of the different group norms in order to positively affect the overall work of the group. Norms may vary greatly between military members and civilian organizations.
Status permeates every society and can be defined as the position or rank given to both individuals and groups. There are several keys to understand about status as they relate to the building of an effective working team. The first can be explained by the status characteristics theory. Status generally is derived from three sources; the power a person wields over others; a person's ability to contribute to a group's goals; and an individual's personal characteristics.
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Generally people perceived as high status individuals are better able to resist pressure to conform and are better able to deviate from other group norms. Also important to remember is that group interaction tends to be influenced by status and high status individuals tend to be more assertive within the group. This is especially important for Army personnel who operate daily in an environment where rank plays a key role. Generally, group members will perform better when they perceive an equitable status hierarchy. It is important to note that status perceptions vary by culture and must be taken into consideration when appropriate. Status is a way of life in the Army but may not be as well understood by other organizations with which Army personnel may operate.
Cohesiveness, a trademark of Army organizations, represents how well individual members perform as part of, and remain committed to, the group. Cohesiveness relates directly to a group's ability to produce. General factors for success include keeping group size small, 53 Ibid., 104.
encouragements of group agreement, increased time together, increasing group status, competition with other groups, rewarding the group instead of the individual, and isolating the group. 55 Certainly not all of these factors for success will apply for Army personnel attempting to increase the cohesiveness of non-military organizations in all situations, but should be kept i mind from the outset of heterogeneous organizational formation.
n The size of the group can and does also affect group behavior. Generally smaller groups complete tasks more rapidly and larger groups are better at problem solving. It is important to keep in mind the tendency for individuals to expend less effort when acting as a member of a group. This tendency even has its own label, social loafing. 56 In developing an effective team it is important to have a mechanism in place to monitor individual contributions to overcome this attribute. This can become especially prevalent when one part of the group develops a feeling of alienation from another. Army personnel should remain aware of this tendency especially given the general take charge attitude of military members.
Finally, the composition of the group will have an impact on developing an effective team. In tasks that have a substantial amount of complexity, heterogeneous groups are more likely to have the right mix of abilities and information to be more effective than homogenous groups. 57 Even though an expanded composition can be initially challenging to develop, expanding beyond the typical Army composition then can go a long way in gaining a better understanding of the complex environments in which forces are likely to be found operating.
In the end, expanding the organization make-up can go a long way in positively influencing efficiency and productivity. Although the speed with which decisions are made is generally increased in a smaller group, larger structures are typically able to generate more complete information, offer an increased diversity of views, and therefore are able to develop 54 Ibid., 107. 55 Ibid., 109. 56 Ibid., 110.
higher quality decisions. 58 Unfortunately, misunderstandings often arise in diverse group settings when there is either a lack of desire or because the groups have not been able to work and grow together for a long enough period of time. Understanding group structure will help in overcoming these misunderstandings.
In 
Expand the Personnel, Expand Problem Solving
Having an enhanced appreciation for a security environment that goes beyond a purely military understanding; expanding the Army's problem solving and planning process to embrace such concepts as Systemic Operational Design and Effects Based Approach; and having an increased awareness about how the message is communicated outside of the typical Army organization will certainly go a long way in improving the Army's ability to operate in a more complex operating environment. However, there should be further research conducted 57 Ibid., 111.
concerning the impact of how an expanded Army personnel structure would be able to expand the Army's problem solving capability.
The United States Army is an organization that has achieved considerable success in its 232 year history largely because of its homogeneity. Considerable effort is placed on minimizing the individual in order to create greater value in the organization. Homogeneous groups are able to make decisions faster, with clearer accountability, and generally with more consistent values.
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However, as demonstrated in the previous section, there can also be tremendous value in heterogeneity, especially with regards to group problem solving. Another advantage is escaping the trappings, which can occur in a more homogeneous organization such as the Army, of groupthink. Groupthink, occurs when members feel so strongly that they need to adhere to generally accepted organizational views that the realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action and a full acceptance of deviant, minority, or unpopular views are no longer accepted or appreciated. 60 The commander driven military decision making process because of wide acceptance within the Army can be a source of groupthink even though that is not its intention.
Stephen Robbins presented four characteristics of groupthink in his book, Essentials of Through a more complete acceptance of the various talents and capabilities of naturally born citizens, allowing some to maintain a greater degree of individuality, the United States Army would achieve heterogeneity in its problem solving and decision making processes. The complexity of modern battlefields demand much more than merely a shift in thinking by way of incorporating such tools as Systemic Operational Design or Effects Based Approaches. These tools do represent a tremendous step in the right direction but will remain limited without an expansion of the Army's thought base across the entire population spectrum. The shedding of individual identity in order to become a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine should not be necessary for all who want to serve. Taking away some individuality is much more necessary for the warrior class of soldier, someone willing to kill and/or die for his or her country. These warriors are the bedrock of the Armed Forces. However, with the onset of globalization there has arrived a need for much more than simply a highly trained warrior, the Army needs those who can think in the non-linear, complex, and uncertain environments that now exist. This is about the future of America and it requires all Americans.
A commonly uttered phrase among military members is that the military is at war, not the I believe that to achieve the initial stage of success would be to create a segment of soldier telecommuters. Allow into the force all segments of the population as they are. Gay, goth, and the overweight all have a potential role. Accept the risk that the military can remain the envy of the world. Loosen the traditional rigidity and find out if such a move can result in an enhanced capability. There will certainly be some failures as no change is perfect, but be willing Another potential benefit would be decreased costs associated with basing. There will always remain a requirement for a training and maintenance infrastructure that exists in the Army's current basing arrangements. However, as costs continue to rise and requirements to minimize infrastructure continue, the military does not have to sacrifice its capability, the people.
Allow the warriors to occupy the base complexes and leverage technology to capitalize on the capability of the thinkers.
Army leaders must recognize that their experiences can also be one of their primary liabilities. The current military hierarchical structure depends on the experiences or its senior leaders for decision making. However, this closed group mentality can, and does, limit organizational progress. Individual experiences, regardless of age, rank, status, etc., taken collectively, and if large enough will exponentially expand the organizations ability to solve complex problems. The intent is not to get more information but rather a broader perspective or even greater specialized knowledge. Information itself is not power. Power is maximizing the ability to share information in the era of globalization.
Success in the future demands that all ideas, from all walks of life, are valuable. This concept equates to enhanced empowerment for the individual, the military, and the Nation. The Army must do a better job of becoming inclusive versus exclusive. America's most powerful asset is its diversity. Homogeneity or cultural exclusion is what defines the preponderance of the rest of the world's nations. This proclivity to exclude has also been a significant source of conflict and stagnant economic growth for these same nations. See the backyard of the United States for countless examples.
71 Numerous Latin American countries are still stuck on a concept of whiteness, a preference for those of Spanish ancestry which purportedly equates to superiority, which has caused a persistent marginalization of their indigenous base. 72 Conflict and poverty remain the norm. Countless stories abound with regards to being too quick to judge and yet the military remains such an organization. The Army must overcome our exclusivity and embrace inclusivity to win the long war.
Conclusion
America remains the envy of the world. America's political institution is admired for its openness and fairness. Thousands of individuals come to America every year to study at our renowned colleges and universities. Individual Americans have achieved a level of personal wealth that is only a dream for most other individuals in most other nations. The word freedom is synonymous with America. The choices American's have for where they live, what they eat, the types of entertainment they enjoy, the material possessions they accumulate, etc. are almost
innumerable. Yet for all of the nation's accomplishments there seems to be almost, a sense of immunity from the trials and tribulations that others experience.
American's are a product of their experiences. Generally they depend on the past as a way to efficiently guide current and future efforts. However, either because of a change to the environment by which past experiences are no longer able to serve as a useful guide; or because the confronted situation is so complex it is rendered as unrecognizable, there must be attempts to understand outside of the individual and collective experience base. To do so is to challenge the the United States no longer faced serious security threats of any kind". 73 The military community, regardless of the direction that academic and policy communities take, can never afford to become lax about the security environment.
Today there are countless pages of literature demonstrating the plethora of security issues that currently face America and those that may be just over the horizon. "Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it must be met with short-term military action, informed by in-depth, long-term, sophisticated analysis." 74 People will be what enables the nation to collectively overcome the current challenge faced by terrorism. Collective abilities will also enable the nation to overcome the challenges to environmental security, global health and human security, and weapons proliferation. Abilities, however, must be reevaluated from time to time in order to ensure that they are being maximized. Plans that promote democracy must also include security, economics, law, and other programs and services. "If the world is to escape the sword hanging over it, the United States will need not just the approval but the active support of the allies that stood with it during the cold war as well as those that can be brought into the Kantian community in the future." 75 The current abilities of the U.S. Army are not being maximized and therefore a transformation must take place for real security to be achieved.
The transformation that I have discussed requires an update to the Army's military decision making process. "The modern world is made up of innumerable interrelated subsystems, and we need to think in terms of these interrelations." 76 MDMP, as currently written in doctrine, is a useful tool for linear, well defined, problems. However, it is essential that when dealing with those problems that have ill-defined goals, time is taken to gain a better appreciation of the problem, before progressing to the problem solving process, at the operational level.
In order to get and maintain the initiative, it is imperative that the Army understand the complex environment in which the plan will be executed. "To the ignorant, the world looks simple. If we pretty much dispense with gathering information, it is easy for us to form a clear picture of reality and come to clear decisions based on that picture." 77 As Clausewitz has demonstrated, war is an extension of policy by other means. 78 For many this equates to an understanding that the military should wait for the policy makers to make a decision and then design a plan to execute the policy makers will. This would be assuming that the world is simple and the environment is already understood. I would argue that to assume that the environment, as presented, should be accepted without further thought is a false assumption. There is no one single system, but many systems that must be observed and understood separately, and as part of their interaction within the larger system. In some instances it may be possible to affect change among multiple systems by targeting one, as is the purpose behind an Effects Based Approach.
In other cases, targeting only one part of the system will at best achieve some change in that system and at worse change nothing, which can be better understood by utilizing Systemic Operational Design.
Once an adequate understanding of the problem has been achieved, planners must then be counterproductive. Of course, this may be the exception and it is certainly largely dependent on personality, but when allowed to exist, both effective and critical thought will be squashed.
For the military to be truly able to mitigate the complexity that exists in the current and future operating environments there must be consideration of potential benefits from expanding the eligibility of who can become a soldier. Since operations in Iraq have been extended, there has been a realization that the number of active duty forces should be increased. But where the Army gets these recruits from and how they will be utilized is a different matter. "And since The complexity of the current operating environment has led the Army, and the nation, to this point where transformation is required. The transformation that I am advocating consists of several levels. Expand the Army's military decision making process to include SOD or EBA like concepts in order for decision makers to better understand the problem(s) and how the desired endstate relates to the problem(s). The formation of organizations and communication with non-U.S. Army partners must be reconsidered. The Army cannot afford to be the cause of misunderstanding simply because it prefers a hierarchical structure or expounds a doctrinal concept that is not readily understood outside of the organization. Finally, the Army must be willing to alter its hiring practices. The Army cannot afford to accept a 17-24 year old male populace base in which only 28% are fully qualified for recruitment. If 35%, of potential recruits, are morally or physically disqualified then maybe it is time for the Army to readjust its practice.
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To better prepare for and stay ahead of the new, and highly complex, security environment the U.S. Army must transform how it understands, plans, and communicates.
